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CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE UNITED
STATES IN APPLYING THE DEATH
PENALTY TO MINORS AND POSSIBLE
REPERCUSSIONS TO THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION

O

n August 28, 2002 the American judicial system took yet
another step backwards in the eyes of the international
community when the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion denying a stay of execution to Toronto M. Patterson despite the dissenters’ urging that it reconsider his claim arising
out of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 With total disregard of international human rights standards, the Court allowed Toronto Patterson to be executed for a
crime that he committed as a juvenile.2 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence and the
United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus3 ultimately sending Toronto Patterson to his
death. This Comment suggests that in doing so, the Court violated international treaties, customary international law, and
jus cogens.4
This Comment explores the tension between the United
States Supreme Court’s validation of the application of the

1. Patterson v. State of Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002).
2. Id. For the purposes of this Comment a juvenile is any child under the
age of eighteen years.
3. Id.
4. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Dec. 16, 1996, G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
(entered into force Nov. 10. 1989; not in force for the United States), 28 I.L.M.
1448, 1456–76 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]; American Convention on Human
Rights, open for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, para. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143,
146 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19. 1966, art. 6, para. 5, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174–75 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 330 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention].
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death penalty to children who were convicted of offenses they
committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen and the current
treaty obligations of the United States concerning the execution
of minors.5 Part I examines prior case history involving the
death penalty as it relates to minors. Part II provides an indepth explanation of the effect of reservations and the selfexecuting treaty doctrine on the Unites States’ ratification and
signatory status of several international treaties governing the
juvenile death penalty. Subsequent analysis focuses on the international consensus banning the execution of juvenile criminal offenders through customary international law and jus cogens in Part III. Thereafter, Part IV turns to an alternative
argument focusing on the internal corruption of the American
judicial system if it continues to practice juvenile execution.
This section will analyze the concept of procedural due process
and its application in cases like those of Zacarias Moussaui and
Lee Boyd Malvo, where our execution practices may be the reason that other countries do not provide the evidence or witnesses necessary for a full and fair trial of these, and other, individuals in the United States. This would cause irreparable
harm to the American judicial system.
I. PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
JUVENILES, AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,6 for the first time in history
the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty,
as then applied, to be cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.7 However, the opinion was per curiam
5. In discussing the execution of minors the author is referring to the
juvenile death penalty or the execution of individuals who committed the
crimes for which they are sentenced to death as children ages 16 and 17. The
term “juvenile death penalty” was taken from a case comment authored by
Elizabeth A. Reimels. See Elizabeth A. Reimels, Comment, Playing For
Keeps: The United States Interpretation of International Prohibitions Against
the Juvenile Death Penalty—The U.S. Wants to Play the International Human
Rights Game, But Only if It Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 303, 306
(2001).
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1992) (holding that the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty on felons convicted of rape or murder was
cruel and unusual).
7. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See also
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with each of the five Justices in the majority writing his own
concurring opinion exemplifying vastly different reasoning,
ranging from categorical opposition to the death penalty to concern over the arbitrary nature of death sentences at the time.8
As a result, thirty–five states revised their Death Penalty statutes in an effort to conform to Supreme Court guidelines9 and
four years later the Court rejected the view that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual punishment.10 In Gregg v.
Georgia, the Court upheld a Georgia capital punishment law
that utilized certain trial procedures and appeals designed to
prevent the penalty from being imposed arbitrarily.11 The Court
noted that based on the legislative response following Furman,
indicating society’s endorsement of the death penalty, the evolving standard of decency argument, which had prevailed in
Furman, could not be used to strike down capital punishment;12
therefore the death penalty should be reinstated.
BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES – LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19–44 (Butterworth-Heinenmann 1998).
8. Latzer, supra note 7, at 4. In the concurring opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall both Justices expressly contended that the death
penalty was per se unconstitutional. Justice Brennan focused on the unusual
severity of the punishment of death because of its “finality and enormity;”
Furman, 408 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring); while Justice Marshall
mainly discussed the lack of any legitimate legislative purpose; id. at 359
(Marshall, J., concurring). Whereas Justices Stewart and White do not believe that the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible under all circumstances; they instead indicated that given reforms to the statutes, more
clearly defining the categories of crimes that require imposition of the death
penalty, their votes might be swayed to form a new majority in favor of the
death penalty. Id. at 306–14 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 245.
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See also Latzer, supra note 7, at
4.
11. Id.
12. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155. After the decision in Furman, 35 states rewrote their death penalty statutes in an effort to conform to the guidelines
that were set forth. Here the Georgia statute was amended to rectify the
problem of arbitrariness that plagued Justice Stewart and Justice White in
Furman by stating that the imposition of the death penalty was only permitted when trial judges and juries were sentencing defendants for homicides
having certain characteristics, called aggravating factors, and only where
there were insufficient mitigating factors (factors that make the offense less
reprehensible). Id. at 163. See also Latzer, supra note 7, at 45. Moreover the
Georgia statute provided for bifurcated trials, which consists of a trial and
then a separate sentencing proceeding after the defendant was found guilty,
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Thirteen years later, Americans saw the policy of capital punishment further broadened when the Supreme Court upheld the
legality of the use of the death penalty for sixteen and seventeen year old offenders in Stanford v. Kentucky.13 There, the
Court looked at two consolidated cases where the defendants
were convicted and sentenced to death. In one case, a Kentucky
minor was seventeen years and four months old when he and
his accomplice raped, sodomized, and eventually killed their
victim.14 The other case involved a Missouri minor who was sixteen and a half years old when, during the commission of a robbery of a convenience store, he killed the sales clerk.15 Both defendants argued that the application of the death penalty in
their respective cases violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.16 The Court considered state and federal statutes as well as the behavior of
prosecutors and juries as “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction”17 to determine if a “societal
consensus” against the juvenile death penalty existed. The
Court concluded that according to the “evolving standards of
decency” the punishment was not cruel and unusual and instead fell within the “demonstrable current standards of our
citizens.”18
Of great significance was the fact that the majority’s opinion
in Stanford was devoid of any discussion or analysis of international views and norms, concerning the execution of convicts
who committed the punishable offense while they were minors,
save for a footnote stating that this type of analysis would not
be done.19 Conversely, only one year prior to the decision in
Stanford, the Court focused on international law standards
as well as direct appeals of capital convictions to the state’s highest court. Id.
These procedures allayed the Justices’ fears and caused Justice Stewart and
Justice White to change their anti-death penalty opinions, illustrated in
Furman, to a pro-death penalty stance here. This resulted in a new majority
that upheld Georgia’s death penalty statute. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
13. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
14. Id. at 368.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 370.
18. Id. at 378.
19. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 306.
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when it addressed the similar question of whether or not the
execution of children younger than sixteen years of age was
constitutional in Thompson v. Oklahoma.20 There, the Court
concluded in a plurality opinion that imposing the death penalty on a fifteen year old offender would “offend civilized standards of decency” in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.21 The plurality decision
relied upon the views of the international community regarding
the juvenile death penalty.22 The Court looked to several nations’ attitudes against the juvenile death penalty in reaching
its conclusion that a consensus existed among the international
community opposing the execution of children.23 In addition,
Justice Stevens noted three current international treaties
which prohibit the use of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.24 These treaties included: Article 6 Paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) — a
global civil rights treaty prohibiting the execution of minors
20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion). Thompson stands for the proposition that the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles is too extreme a punishment due to the fact that
fifteen year olds do not possess the requisite culpability to be death penalty
eligible because “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of
adults.” Id. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 86, 104, 115–16,
n.11 (1958)).
21. Id. at 821. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren,
C.J. plurality opinion) (holding that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man …. The amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”) Id. at 100–01.
22. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
23. The Court stated that “[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized
standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed … by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by
the leading members of the Western European community.” Id. at 830. Subsequently the Court mentioned the fact that several nations had either abolished the death penalty or restricted its use by excluding juveniles, id. at 830–
31, specifically noting that the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet
Union prohibit the execution of juveniles; that Canada, Italy, Spain, and
Switzerland allow capital punishment only for “exceptional crimes such as
treason[;]” and that West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and
all of the Scandinavian countries forbid capital punishment. Id.
24. Id. at 831 n.34.
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under eighteen years of age,25 Article 4 Paragraph 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights — a regional human
rights treaty prohibiting the execution of minors under eighteen
years of age,26 and Article 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Fourth Geneva Convention) — which prohibits executing minors during wartimes who are under eighteen at the time of
their offense.27 Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, also
relied on international sources and authority, pointing to the
Senate’s ratification of the Fourth Geneva Convention to determine that there could be no inference of a senatorial sanction
of the juvenile death penalty through past legislation.28
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court abandoned its
reliance on the use of international standards and treaty obligations to determine what “evolving standards of decency” are
within the confines of the United States in deciding whether the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, it is significant to note that the Court did in
fact use this type of analysis. By mentioning international
standards, the Court seems to be indicating that the norms of
the global community are important to its determination of a
consensus regarding the juvenile death penalty.29 Furthermore,
the United States has ratified the ICCPR30 and signed the
United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child31 since
the Court last heard a case involving the execution of a juvenile
25. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5.
26. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5.
27. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68. See also Reimels,
supra note 5, at 307.
28. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821–23 (1988) (O’Connor, J.
concurring). In referencing the obligations that the United States had undertaken by ratifying the Geneva Convention, which prohibited the wartime execution of children under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense, Justice O’Connor undermined the dissent’s assertion that the Senate had,
through other legislation, authorized and approved the death penalty for minors as young as fifteen. See Reimels, supra note 5, at 308.
29. Reimels, supra note 5, at 309.
30. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5. See also Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
31. CRC, supra note 4, at art. 6, art. 37.
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offender, so it is possible that the next juvenile death penalty
case it decides will come out differently.32 Thus, this Comment
will now turn to an examination of the laws governing treaties
in the United States with a focus on treaties concerning the Juvenile Death Penalty.

32. Moreover, in June of 2002, the Unites States Supreme Court ruled that
subjecting the mentally retarded to the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002). That same year, in In re Stanford, the Court denied certiori
to Kevin Stanford - another individual sentenced to death for a crime he committed as minor - over a strong dissent authored by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Souter. These four Justices wanted not
only to revisit the issue of the juvenile death penalty, but they were ready to
declare it unconstitutional. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens went so far as to state that the Court should
follow the majority’s analysis in Atkins and find that executing juvenile defendants offends evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. Justice Stevens opined that most of the reasons supporting the prohibition
of executing the mentally retarded in Atkins were present regarding the juvenile death penalty and thus, the Court should grant Stanford’s habeas corpus
petition. Id. Interestingly, the only factor present in Atkins but absent in
Stanford was the number of States expressly forbidding the juvenile death
penalty; twenty-eight states ban the execution of juvenile offenders whereas
thirty states banned the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. Regardless,
unlike Toronto Patterson, Kevin Stanford’s life was spared when the Governor
of Kentucky granted him clemency on December 8, 2003 and commuted his
death sentence to life imprisonment evincing further evidence of anti-juvenile
death penalty sentiments. Thus, not only has the international consensus
been solidified against the juvenile death penalty but there also appears to be
a concomitant national consensus forming on the subject as well. See also
Jeffrey M. Banks, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for
Juvenile Offenders?, 48. S.D. L. REV. 327, 353 (2003).
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II. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THEIR APPLICATION IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM
A. Treaties in General and the Impact of Senate Reservations
and the Self-Executing Doctrine on Their Implementation
1. Overview of the Laws Governing Treaties in the United
States and Abroad
A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law.”33
Since treaties are the principal source of international law,34 it
was important to codify that law through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).35 Although
the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, its
Department of State as well as its courts have indicated that
they consider the Vienna Convention an accurate restatement
of the customary international law of treaties; thus the Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Restatement) adopted most of its text from that treaty.36
However, supplementing governance by the Vienna Convention,
treaties are also subject to the constraints of the United States
Constitution, customary international law, and domestic and
international judicial decisions in addition to the influence of
the academic writings of legal scholars.37
According to the Constitution, treaties are the “supreme Law
of the Land.”38 While early in our nation’s history treaties were
33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980; not in force for the
United States) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
34. Id. at 332.
35. Id.
36. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Fredrick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate
Control Over the Conclusions and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
571, 574 (1991). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS: PART III INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Introductory Note (1987)
(referring to the State Department’s statements that “although not yet in
force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative
guide to current treaty law and practice.”) (quoting S. Exec. Doc. L., 92nd
Cong., 1st sess. (1971) p.1.) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
37. Id. See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 311.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 providing that: “This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
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believed to be extra-constitutional, it is now widely accepted
that agreements with foreign nations can only grant power to a
branch of our government subject to Constitutional restraints.39
Furthermore, whereas the Constitution takes precedence over a
treaty, a treaty is understood to be the equivalent of a federal
statute.40 Nevertheless, where a treaty and a federal statute are
found to be conflicting, the most recently enacted instrument
supercedes the other; this gives rise to the “last in time doctrine.”41 However, the last in time rule only applies to interactions between treaties and federal law; thus a treaty is superior
to state law as well as any state constitution.42
Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution confers
on the President the power to enter the United States into treaties with the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate.43
After a treaty has been negotiated by the Executive branch, it is
sent to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which
prepares a report and recommends to the full Senate whether
or not to ratify the treaty.44 This recommendation can include
proposed amendments to the treaty such as reservations, understandings, declarations or provisos.45 After assent of the
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.” See also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36,
at 576.
39. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (holding that a treaty cannot be used to deprive a citizen of a constitutional right). See also Reimels,
supra note 5, at 310.
40. Id. at 18. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 115.
41. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Cherokee
Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870). These cases all illustrate the
concepts that treaties cannot exceed the boundaries of rights and duties created by the United States Constitution, that a treaty supersedes a prior inconsistent federal statute, and that a subsequent inconsistent federal statute
supersedes a treaty; creating the “last in time doctrine.” See also Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 36, at 577; Reimels, supra note 5, at 310.
42. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
43. “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 580.
45. Id. See also infra pp. 1256–60 on reservations. In United States practice, an “understanding” generally refers to a statement by which the govern-
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Senate is given, the President may ratify the treaty as long as
any additional conditions attached to the resolution of ratification are fulfilled.46 Furthermore, since the President has the
power to execute the laws of the land and a treaty is the law of
the land, it is the President’s role to carry out a treaty’s terms.47
However, the Supreme Court is granted the final power to interpret treaties under Article III of the United States Constitution.48
2. Reservations to Treaties
Part I Article 2 of the Vienna Convention defines a reservation as “a unilateral statement … made by a state when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that

ment expresses its interpretation, clarification, or elaboration of a particular
treaty provision and a “declaration” generally refers to a statement by which
the government states its position with respect to the applicability or nonapplicability of the rules of a separate treaty or international law to the treaty
in question. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 602. The third type of
Senate condition or understanding is a proviso which “includes those [conditions] which are not intended to be included in the formal instruments of ratification because they do not involve the other parties to the treaty but instead
relate to issues of U.S. law or procedure.” Id. at 619 (quoting Congressional
Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of
The United States Senate, A Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign
Relations by the Congressional Research Service, S. Rpt. No. 98-205, 110,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)).
46. Id. “The Senate does not itself ratify a treaty, but rather passes a resolution of ratification authorizing the President to ratify. Reservations, understandings and declarations are included in the [S]enate’s resolution of ratification and transmitted to the President for inclusion in the instrument of ratification ….” Id. at n.59.
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, providing that: “The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”
See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 1 reporter’s note 2 & § 326 cmt. a.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, providing that: “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Moreover, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that: “The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ….”
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State.”49 Part II Section 2 Articles 19 through 23 of the Vienna
Convention govern reservations. Generally, a reservation made
by a party to a treaty is valid and effective if it does not defeat
the object and purpose of the treaty and it is not prohibited by
the terms of the treaty.50 Another party to the treaty can object
to the reservation but that objection does not necessarily make
the treaty, as a whole, per se invalid between the reserving and
objecting parties.51 Instead the objection excludes the provision
in the treaty to which the reservation and objection apply as
between those two parties.52 Only if the objecting party expressly articulates that it does not intend to be bound by the
treaty as a whole will the objection preclude the entry into force
of the treaty as between the reserving and objecting parties.53
Moreover, if a party to a treaty does not object to the reservation in a timely manner, then that party is presumed to have
accepted the reservation and to be willing to be bound with the
reserving party.54 Therefore, reservations and objections only
apply to the parties to whom they have been addressed and
have no effect on the treaty obligations of other parties in a
multilateral treaty.55
The Senate routinely attaches reservations to treaties which
it receives for advice and consent.56 Recently, the Senate has
attempted to expressly reserve the supremacy of the internal
law of the United States57 by making reservations which modify
the results of treaty obligations domestically from the original
intent of the treaty negotiators.58 As one scholar notes, “[b]y its

49. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 2(1)(d).
50. Id. at art. 19. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 313. Furthermore, according to general international law a reservation is also invalid if it
violates customary international law or if it conflicts with a newly emergent
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens). Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for
the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F.L. L. Rev. 735, 754 (1998).
51. Id. at art. 20.
52. Id. at art. 21.
53. Id.
54. Id. at art. 20.
55. Id. at art. 21. See also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 586.
56. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 586.
57. Id. at 573.
58. Reimels, supra note 5, at 311. See also infra pp. 1271–75 discussing
the United States reservations to the ICCPR.
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reservations, the United States apparently seeks to assure that
its adherence to a convention will not change, or require
change, in U.S. laws, policies or practices, even where they fall
below International standards.”59 While it is true that some
reservations facilitate the ratification of treaties,60 as well as
help bring them into compliance with the United States Constitution, many reservations recently issued have been much
broader than necessary.61 As reservations have historically
identified specific domestic legislation with which the treaty
may be incompatible, leading scholars believe that broad reservations might prove impermissible.62
Moreover, if a reservation is deemed invalid,63 it can either be
severed from the party’s accession to the treaty, in which case
the party is still bound by the original treaty provisions, or if
the invalid reservation cannot be separated, then the State
would no longer be a party to the instrument.64 A growing international consensus has concluded that an invalid reservation
59. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 342 (1995). However, Professor William A. Schabas makes a valid point that article 27 of the Vienna Convention does not allow a party to a treaty to invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 284
(1995). Even though the United States is not a party to that treaty it does use
the treaty as a guide for foreign relations law and as such should prohibit the
use of domestic law as an excuse for violations of its treaty obligations
through reservations. But See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 115 (stating
that the “last in time rule” applies to conflicting treaty and federal statute
terms but not state statute or state constitutional terms).
60. Schabas, supra note 59, at 287.
61. Reimels, supra note 5, at 311 (citing Henkin, supra note 59, at 342–44).
It is argued that the reason for these over broad reservations is to curtail the
effect of the treaty, to which they apply, when implementing it domestically.
62. Schabas, supra note 59, at 283, 291. For example, Norway and Ireland
both issued reservations to article 6, paragraph 5 of the ICCPR which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed when an individual is younger than eighteen years-of-age. There, both countries identified a
specific paragraph in article 6 with which their domestic law did not comply;
on the other hand the United States’ reservation encompassed practically all
of the provision. Id. at 291.
63. See also supra pp. 1256–57 and n.50 for a discussion of what invalidates a treaty.
64. Schabas, supra note 59, at 278. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36,
§ 311 cmt. b & reporter’s notes 2–3.
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should be severed from the document of instrumentation.65 A
noteworthy illustration of this was made by the European Court
of Human Rights in the case of Belilos v. Switzerland where, in
conformity with the Vienna Convention, a Swiss statement to
the Court was determined to be an invalid reservation to the
European Convention on Human Rights due to its inconsistency
with the express terms as well as the object and purpose of the
treaty.66 There, the European Court of Human Rights held that
if a non-essential (derogable) reservation is invalid, it is severed
from the treaty and the country submitting the reservation is
still a party to the treaty and, as such, is bound by the provision
without the reservation.67 This marked the first decision of an
international tribunal with respect to the international law of
treaties and treaty reservations that nullified the reservation
and applied the treaty in its totality to the reserving State.68
Significantly, with respect to human rights treaties, reservations have frequently been criticized for weakening the overall
effectiveness of the norms that they are trying to create as
minimum standards.69 The difference between human rights
treaties and other types of treaties is that “parties to human
rights treaties agree to protect individuals within their jurisdictions, while parties to other treaties take on obligations con65. See Connie de la Vega, Amici Curiae Urge the U.S. Supreme Court to
Consider International Human Rights Law in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1041, 1053. See also Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos
Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 347
(1989).
66. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10
Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988).
67. Id. See de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1053. In deciding whether the
reservation was non-essential the Court considered whether the country’s
overriding intention was to accept the obligations under the treaty. Id. See
also Bourguignon, supra note 65, at 382.
68. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 588–89. Similarly, in an advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, a Guatemalan death penalty reservation was invalidated because it sought to suspend
a non-derogable fundamental right of the treaty and thus was incompatible
with the object and purpose of the American Convention. de la Vega &
Brown, supra note 50, at 755 (quoting Edward Sherman, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treat Formation,
29 TEX. INT’L L.J.69, 79 (1994)).
69. Schabas, supra note 59, at 287.
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cerning their actions with respect to each other.”70 The object
and purpose of human rights conventions are to promote respect for the basic rights of individual human beings by having
party states mutually assume legal obligations to ensure those
recognized rights within their borders in accordance with international standards.71 Thus, reservations to human rights treaties that make general allusions to domestic law are disapproved of and often provoke formal objections72 because in essence, by adhering to human rights conventions subject to these
reservations, the State is “pretending to assume international
obligations but in fact … undertaking nothing.”73
3. The Self-Executing Doctrine in the Application
of Treaties to Domestic Law
The self-executing doctrine, like Senate imposed reservations
to treaties, has a significant impact on the execution and enforcement of treaties. The Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of
the land.74 This Clause effectuated “a wholesale incorporation of
U.S. treaties into domestic law, dispensing with the need for
retail transformation of treaties into domestic law by Congress.”75 The self-executing treaty doctrine is a judicially cre70. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.
71. Henkin, supra note 59, at 343. See also The Effect of Reservations on
the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory
Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A: Judgments
and Opinions, No. 2, para. 29 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37, 47 (1983); de la
Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.
72. Schabas, supra note 59, at 284. For example the U.S. reservations to
articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR were answered with objections from eleven
party States. Id. at 310.
73. Henkin, supra note 59, at 344.
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 699 (1995). This was done in response to the rule in
Great Britain that all treaties required, and still require, implementing legislation passed by Parliament before they would be enforced by officials applying domestic law, regardless of the treaty’s terms or intents. Id. at 698. During the time of the Articles of Confederation, Great Britain repeatedly violated
the Treaty of Peace. Id. Moreover, treaties concluded by the Continental
Congress were not enforceable as law in the courts of the states if there was
conflicting state legislation and no repealing acts of legislation were passed.
Id. Therefore, to combat these problems with the implementation of treaties
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ated rule developed as a qualification to the Supremacy
Clause.76 Generally, a self-executing treaty is one that may be
enforced, once it is ratified, without requiring prior domestic
legislation to take effect, whereas a non-self-executing treaty is
one that may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative implementation.77 Courts have applied several different
theories in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.78
Professor Carlos Vazquez identified four distinct doctrines of
self-executing treaties.79 The first and most widely accepted of
these doctrines is the intent-based doctrine80 which was introduced into United States jurisprudence by the Supreme Court
in Foster v. Neilson.81 The dispute arose over a claim to a tract
of land in Florida on the basis of a grant from Spain.82 The
Court ultimately held that it could not recognize the grant as
valid under domestic law because the language of the treaty
indicated the intention that Congress enact legislation confirm-

the Framers adopted the Supremacy Clause declaring treaties as the supreme
law of the land and directing courts to give them effect without awaiting actions by the legislatures of either the states or the federal government. Id. at
699.
76. Id. at 697–98. See generally Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights during the
1990’s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423 (1997).
77. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 695.
78. Id. While Professor Vazquez’s determination of four distinct doctrines
of the theory of self-executing treaties has been the most widely accepted,
there are other legal scholars who have discovered different tests of the selfexecuting nature of treaties. For example, Professor de la Vega has distinguished three tests that courts in the United States have used to decide
whether a clause of a particular treaty is self-executing. de la Vega, supra
note 76, at 448. In the first test, the Court establishes whether or not the
treaty is equivalent to a legislative act and if it is then the treaty is selfexecuting. Id. In the second test the Court examines the responsibilities
mandated by the treaty provision to see if they require self execution. Id.
Finally, the third test that Professor de la Vega describes is intent based. Id.
at 446–47. Here, there has been some debate because courts have differed as
to where they find this intent to make the treaty self-executing. Some courts
have looked for the “intent of the parties” as reflected in the words of the
treaty alone whereas others have determined the intent through looking at
the words of the treaty in addition to the circumstances surrounding its execution. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1041.
79. Id. at 696.
80. Id. at 699–700.
81. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
82. Id. at 253.
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ing the grant.83 However, the Court also noted that because the
Constitution makes a treaty the law of the land it is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”84 The Court narrowed the scope of non-selfexecuting treaties in United States v. Percheman when, by focusing on both the Spanish and English text of the treaty, it
held that the treaty did “operate of itself” and could be applied
by the courts without legislative implementation.85 Thus, the
decisions in Foster and Percheman recognized the general rule
that treaties do not require legislative implementation in the
United States “by their nature,” but may require legislative implementation through the affirmative agreement of the parties
clearly stating that it is the parties’ intent to alter that rule.86
Recently, however, the courts have changed their focus when
determining intent for self-execution doctrine purposes. Lower
courts have sought to discern the intent of the United States
negotiators of the treaty, the President and the Senate, instead
of the intent of all of the parties to the treaty and have done so
by looking beyond the actual terms of the treaty.87 Indeed, the
courts have begun to perceive the inquiry as a search for the
unilateral intent of the President in ratifying the treaty or the
Senate in giving its advice and consent.88 The Restatement
adopts this test of determining intent by reasoning that if there
is no language in the international agreement as to its selfexecuting character and the intention of the United States is
unclear, “account must be taken of any statement by the President in concluding the agreement, or in submitting it to the
Senate for consent, or to the Congress as a whole for approval,
and of any expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing
with the agreement.”89
83. Id. at 314.
84. Id. See also Vazquez, supra note 75, at 700.
85. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (2 Pet.) 51 (1833).
86. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 702, 704.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id.
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. h. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 36, § 314 cmt. h, d & § 303 cmt. d. However, there has been much
debate as to whether the intent of only one of the parties would determine the
effect of a particular clause in the case of multilateral agreements. de la Vega,
supra note 76, at 448.
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Moreover, the courts seem to have reversed the Foster and
Percheman principle that, absent a clear statement of intent by
the parties to have a treaty be subject to implementing legislation, it is self-executing; courts now look for evidence of an intent on the part of the United States officials to make the treaty
self-executing and without it will presume that the treaty is
non-self-executing and thus not enforceable in the courts without legislative implementation.90 Futhermore, even the intention of the parties that the Court is trying to determine has become confused. For example, recently the intent relevant to the
self-execution inquiry has been described as an intent to create
“private rights,” or “judicially enforceable private rights,” or as
“private rights of action,” or as an intent that the provision be
judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals.91 The problems with this are that it leads to the misassumption that a
treaty’s judicial enforceability is always a mater of intent,
whereas that is not always the case, and it does not clarify the
kind of intent necessary to make a treaty self-executing.92
The second doctrine noted by Professor Vazquez is the justiciability doctrine.93 Under this doctrine, the inquiry does not
involve a “search for evidence of an intent regarding whether
the ultimate object of the treaty was to be accomplished through
future acts of legislation.”94 Instead courts have viewed a
treaty’s self-executing or non-self-executing nature as “a characteristic that exists independently of any intent to require legislation” and have discerned this essence through any guidance
that they find useful.95 An illustration of this approach is conth
tained in the decision in Frolova v. USSR, where the 7 Circuit
Court of Appeals enumerated the factors that it considered
relevant to the inquiry into whether the treaty was intended to
90. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 708. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §
111 cmt. h.
91. Id. at 710. While the concepts of the private right of action and the
self-executing treaty doctrine are distinct, Professor Vazquez has deciphered
at least one self-executing treaty doctrine that considers whether the treaty
has created a private right of action for individuals in determining the selfexecuting nature of that treaty.
92. Id. This concept will be further discussed infra pp. 1263–69 when we
turn to the other three self-executing treaty doctrines described by Vazquez.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 711.
95. Id.
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be self-executing.96 The Court in Frolova did not search for actual intent or even an inference of intent; instead it imputed
intent based on factors that addressed reasons, unrelated to
intent, as to why the treaty obligation should not have been judicially enforceable.97
Other factors that some courts have considered in determining whether particular treaties are self-executing, and therefore
judicially enforceable without additional legislation by Congress, are the precatoriness of certain provisions, the indeterminateness of a provision, and the case-by-case analysis of a
treaty.98 These types of provisions are deemed judicially unenforceable not because of the parties’ intent but because in our
domestic system of separated powers the object of the provision
is considered to be a political task and not one for the courts to
perform.99 Other provisions have been held unenforceable because they did not set forth “sufficiently determinate standards
for evaluating the conduct of the parties and their attendant
rights and liabilities.”100 Today, lower courts have tried to answer the self-execution question by inquiring as to whether a
96. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 370–76 (7th
Cir. 1985). Those factors included:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the
circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of
the alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (4) the capability of the judiciary
to resolve the dispute.
97. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 711.
98. Id. at 712–17. Precatory treaty provisions do not impose obligations
but instead set forth aspirations. Id. at 712.
99. Id. at 713. Moreover, it is interesting to note that this test for discerning the self-executing nature of a treaty was not the same as that originally
applied in Foster and Percheman. There, the question was whether intent to
have a self-executing or non-self-executing treaty could be inferred from the
text of the treaty itself. Id. at n.77. In contrast, using the precatory nature of
a provision as a reason to say it is non-self-executing makes the provision
judicially unenforceable without regard to the parties’ intent concerning judicial enforcement. Id.
100. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 713. This variant on the issue of selfexecution originates from dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Head
Money Cases, where the Court said that a treaty can be judicially enforced by
private individuals when it “prescribes a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.” Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
598–99 (1884). See also Vazquez, supra note 75, at 714.
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treaty is “too vague for judicial enforcement,”101 or if it “provides
specific standards,”102 or if it is “phrased in broad generalities.”103
The Restatement has fortified this modification of the selfexecuting treaty doctrine by stating that a treaty is selfexecuting if it “can be readily given effect without further legislation.”104 Furthermore, some lower courts have treated the selfexecuting inquiry as a more “free-wheeling inquiry” into the
treaty’s judicial enforceability, taking into account many factors
in addition to precatoriness and indeterminateness.105 Thus this
third and final variant of the justiciability doctrine seems to ask
courts to engage in an “open-ended inquiry to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether judicial enforcement of a particular
treaty is a good idea.”106

101. People of Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
102. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also
American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
103. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th
Cir. 1985).
104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 reporter’s note 5. Similar to the
line between precatory and obligatory provisions, the line between vague and
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” Golden State Transit
Corp. v. Los Angles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989), is a domestic constitutional
divide that also serves to allocate powers between the courts and the legislature. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 714–15. For example, in People of Saipan
the Court listed the following factors as relevant to determining whether a
treaty “establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without
implementing legislation: … the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of
its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative
enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences
of self or non-self-execution.” People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97.
105. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 715.
106. Id. Moreover, it is important to note the differences between the “intent-based” branch of self-execution and the “justiciability-based” branch. The
justiciability-based branch calls for a constitutional separation-of-powers determination analogous to a political question decision. Id. at 717. This kind
of determination affects not only the particular treaty or treaty provision in
question but also all provisions like it that may come before the court. Id. at
n.102. In contrast, with regard to the intent-based branch, the parties to the
treaty may make a treaty judicially unenforceable for any rational reason and
their decision does not have any necessary implications regarding the judicial
enforceability of other similar treaties. Id.
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The third self-executing treaty doctrine identified by Professor Vasquez is the constitutionality doctrine.107 According to the
Restatement “[a]n international agreement cannot take effect
as domestic law without implementation by Congress if the
agreement would achieve what lies within the exclusive lawmaking power of Congress under the Constitution.”108 Although
there is no definitive judicial authority endorsing this variant of
the self-executing treaty doctrine,109 Professor Vazquez finds
support for it in the Supremacy Clause.110 The test here is
whether the treaty - makers possess the power to accomplish
what they have set out to do in the treaty; if so the treaty is
self-executing and if not, because the power lies with Congress,
the treaty is non-self-executing.111 However, due to the dearth of
case law dealing with the constitutionality version of the selfexecuting doctrine, this category appears to have limited practical significance.112
The fourth and final category of the self-executing doctrines
documented by Professor Vazquez is the private right of action
doctrine.113 This variant on the doctrine asks the question of
107. Id. at 718.
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. i.
109. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 reporter’s note 6.
110. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 717. By illustrating how treaties are subject to all of the provisions of the Constitution the professor concludes that
treaties are unable to accomplish goals which would not be consistent with the
freedoms guaranteed by it, thus making those types of treaties unenforceable.
Id.
111. Id. Significantly, this category of self-executing treaty doctrine differs
considerably from the intent-based category in that in the latter, the treaty’s
non-self-executing character is derived from the intent of the parties or the
treaty makers, whereas in the former the treaty is non-self-executing because
of the treaty makers’ constitutional disability. Id. “Additionally, while the
constitutionality version of the doctrine is similar to the justiciability version
because both require judgments about constitutional allocations of power, the
justiciability version requires a judgment about the distribution of the power
to enforce particular kinds of treaty provisions between the courts and the
legislature and the constitutionality version requires a judgment about the
distribution of the power to accomplish certain ends between the treaty makers and the lawmakers.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 719. The concept that a treaty is selfexecuting and thus judicially enforceable only if it creates a private right of
action found its origin in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
case Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic when Judge Bork in his concurring
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whether the treaty at issue confers a “private right of action”
such that private parties can maintain an action in court to enforce the treaty.114 However, it is incorrect to assume that a
treaty can be enforced in court by private parties only if it confers a private right of action itself.115 Even if a treaty, like many
constitutional provisions and federal statutes, imposes primary
obligations on individuals without expressly addressing matters
of enforcement, it may still be judicially enforceable.116 This is
due to the fact that treaties may be supplemented by the common law117 as well as state118 and federal119 statutory law that
confer “rights of action.”120 Given that the purpose of the domestic courts in our governmental system, since Marbury v.
Madison,121 has been to provide a remedy for the infringement of
individual rights, “by implication the Supremacy Clause, as it
concerns treaties, was intended to confer rights upon individuals.”122 Significantly, even without a private right of action private individuals may “enforce such treaties defensively if they

opinion considered “whether a right of action could be found in the treaties
invoked by the plaintiffs [to determine the self-executing nature of the
treaty].” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
114. Id. However, according to the Restatement, “[w]hether a treaty is selfexecuting is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights
or remedies.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. h. Professor Vazquez
rebuts this by noting that while a treaty that does not itself confer a private
right of action can correctly be described as non-self-executing, if the Restatement is read as discussing the distinction introduced in Foster regarding
self-executing treaties, then the private right of action self-executing treaty
doctrine is not in conflict with the Restatement. Vazquez, supra note 75, at
719, n.134.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Actions of debt and ejectment are two examples of instances where
treaties have been enforced in court through common law forms of action.
See, e.g., Florida v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402, 428 (1901) (action to remove cloud
on legal title); Botiller v. Dominquez, 130 U.S. 238, 243 (1889) (action in the
nature of ejectment).
118. See, e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 125 (1928) (state mandamus
action).
119. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (civil rights legislation).
120. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 720.
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
122. Reimels, supra note 5, at 315. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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are being sued or prosecuted under statutes that are inconsistent with [the] treaty provisions.”123 This defensive use of a
treaty is a judicially accepted means for litigants to successfully
enforce treaty provisions without asking courts to determine
whether the provisions are self-executing.124 Therefore, while a
court ruling or Senate proclamation that a treaty is non-selfexecuting may prevent bringing a direct cause of action under
the treaty, the treaty can still be relied upon as a defense to a
criminal charge125 or the imposition of a sentence such as the
death penalty.
Professor Vazquez’s four variants on the self-executing treaty
doctrine shed some light on yet another aspect of treaty interpretation and enforcement. While all of the different theories of
the self-executing doctrine have played an important part in the
history of treaty law, it is the final category, that of the private
right of action, that seems to have attracted the most attention
lately. As another prominent legal scholar has pointed out, the
recent pattern of Senate declarations that a treaty is non-selfexecuting, and thus does not confer a private right of action on
individuals, “threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty system.”126 This problem most often arises in the case of human
123. Id. For example in Patstone v. Pennsylvania the defendant, a foreign
born Pennsylvania resident, was convicted under state law for owning a shotgun. Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). The defendant asserted
the defense that the statute violated a treaty between Italy and the United
States. Id. While the Supreme Court recognized the defense under the
treaty, it ultimately concluded that there was no conflict between the treaty
and the state law. Id. at 145. Similarly in Kolovrat v. Oregon, the state filed
petitions under its law for escheatment to obtain the land of an intestate decedent whose only next of kin lived in Yugoslavia. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 336
U.S. 187 (1961). The Yugoslavian relatives of the deceased argued that a
treaty between the United States and Yugoslavia allowed for reciprocal rights
of inheritance and that they were therefore eligible heirs to the estate. Id.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, under the treaty to inherit property,
the next of kin did not have to reside in the United States. Id. at 197. See
also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 763.
124. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1056.
125. Reimels, supra note 5, at 316.
126. Henkin, supra note 59, at 348. It is submitted that there is no justification for using a non-self-executing declaration to preserve an inconsistent
statute that predates the treaty because this practice would create an indefensible gap between domestic law and international obligations. Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing”
and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991). The
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rights treaties where, in order to achieve the goals set forth in
the treaty, the individual signatories must pass subsequent
domestic legislation to conform to the treaty requirements.127
This insufficiency can result in a whole class of non-selfexecuting treaties whose main purpose is the protection of individuals who cannot create legislation to protect themselves.
This shall be discussed in the next section examining treaties
dealing with the juvenile death penalty.
B.International Treaties Governing the Juvenile Death Penalty
There are two central issues involved in any discussion of the
domestic impact of an international human rights treaty: the
legal implications of reservations and the status of the treaty as
self-executing or non-self-executing.128 If one would like to invoke a provision of a treaty upon which a reservation has been
attached, one must show that the reservation is invalid because
it violates both the object and purpose of the treaty as well as
the non-derogable nature of the provision.129 Moreover, if the
reservation declares the treaty to be non-self-executing, it is
necessary to introduce counterarguments asserting that the
treaty is self-executing and enforceable because either the
original intent of the parties was to make it self-executing and
to directly confer rights on individuals, or regardless of the
treaty’s self-executing nature its use as a defense is just.130
Modern human rights treaties are not multilateral treaties of
the traditional kind that are created to accomplish a reciprocal
exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting
effect of a non-self-executing declaration attached by the Senate to an otherwise self-executing treaty would be to allow prior inconsistent statutory law to
prevail, even though the courts would have allowed the treaty to supercede
the statute in the absence of the declaration as a result of the last in time
doctrine. Id.
127. Cele Hancock, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and
the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and International Concerns, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 699, 715 (1995). This is
done because some countries, like Great Britain, require implementing legislation for the execution of any treaty.
128. Reimels, supra note 5, at 316.
129. See also Christian A. Levesque, Note, The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: A Primer for Raising a Defense Against the Juvenile
Death Penalty in Federal Courts, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 782 (2001).
130. Id. at 792.
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states.131 The object and purpose of these treaties is “the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective
of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality
and all other contracting States.”132 In concluding human rights
treaties, the party states submit themselves to a legal order by
assuming various obligations, not in relation to other states, but
for the common good of all individuals in their jurisdiction.133
Multilateral treaties seldom make clear the mechanism by
which parties are to incorporate their provisions into national
law134 due to the fact that some countries require implementing
legislation for all treaties whereas others, such as the United
States, do not.135 Further, while few courts in the United States
have considered whether human rights treaties are selfexecuting,136 the test that applies to multilateral treaties137 of
this nature is whether the treaty provision in question addresses the rights and duties of individuals and has extremely
clear prohibitory language indicating that no further legislation
is needed for it to take effect;138 if the treaty comports with these
two requirements, then it is self-executing.
With all of the previously discussed treaty law jurisprudence
in mind, this Comment will now more closely examine interna131. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 755. See also Sherman, supra note 68, at 79–80.
134. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 449.
135. See supra n.75 and accompanying text for a further explanation of this
topic.
136. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 450. For example, the United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether the United Nations Charter’s
human rights clauses are self-executing. Id. However, in Oyama v. California four Justices did support the idea that the United Nations Charter should
be binding on courts in the United States. Id. See also Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).
137. Bourguignon, supra note 65, at 348.
138. See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the
United States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Juvenile
Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v. State of Nevada, 21 WHITTIER L. REV.
215, 220 (1999). See also de la Vega, supra note 76, at 449 (citing Stefan
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 548, 550 (1970)). Regardless of which
test is applicable for use by the courts in determining whether a treaty is selfexecuting, recently the United States has taken to declaring all the human
rights agreements that it ratifies as non-self-executing. Henkin, supra note
59, at 346.
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tional treaties that ban the execution of individuals who committed the crime, for which they were convicted and sentenced,
while they were minors. The United States is a party to two
treaties that prohibit the execution of persons under the age of
eighteen (either at the time of the crime and/or at the time of
execution): the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilians. The United States is also a signatory139 to the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the
Child and the American Declaration of Human Rights. Each
treaty will be examined in turn; however, special attention will
be given to the ICCPR because it has the greatest potential to
be used as persuasive authority in juvenile death penalty defense motions.140
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
a. The United States Reservation to Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is Invalid
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) has been categorized as “nothing less than an international bill of rights [which was] part of an effort to codify the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations’
post-war proclamation of the rights of man.”141 In 1966, the
United Nations General Assembly approved the text of the
treaty and opened the ICCPR for ratification.142 President

139. A signatory to a treaty is a country that has signed the treaty but not
yet ratified it. While that State has not yet manifested its intent to be bound
by the treaty though its ratification, the State is still required to comply with
all the terms and provisions of the treaty. Moreover, once a State signs a
treaty it also agrees not to pass any laws that contradict the treaty provisions
even though that treaty is technically not the law of the land until ratified.
See de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759.
140. Reimels, supra note 5, at 317.
141. John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the
United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 59 (1993).
142. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967).
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Carter made the United States a treaty signatory143 and asked
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the
ICCPR in 1977.144 Nothing was done for the twenty-six years
after the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the treaty and the sixteen years after it went into effect
internationally. Then, on April 2, 1992 the ICCPR was ratified
by the United States Senate, on June 8, 1992 President Bush
deposited the signed ratification instrument with the United
Nations Secretary General,145 and three months later on September 8, 1992 the treaty entered into force in the United
States.146 Between 1966 and 1992, many Senate and executive
administration debates were held dealing with the treaty, illustrating the tension between the United States’ commitment to
human rights and its reluctance to implement the ICCPR into
domestic law.147 As a result, when the United States finally ratified the treaty it did so subject to several reservations, declarations, and understandings.148 Eleven states filed objections to
the reservations, asserting that they were invalid because they
conflicted with the “object and purpose” of the ICCPR.149 Further, the United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded
that under the Vienna Convention, which is the guiding authority on current treaty law,150 the United States’ reservation to
143. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1488 (Oct. 5, 1977), reprinted in 77 DEP’T
ST. BULL. Oct. 1977.
144. 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in 78 DEP’T
ST. BULL. Apr. 1978.
145. 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1008 (Sept. 10, 1992), reprinted in 92
DEP’T ST. BULL. Sept. 1992.
146. See Senate Report, supra note 30, at 645. See Quigley, supra note 141,
at 60.
147. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1170–72 (1993). See also United Nations, Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 Dec. 1999, at
134, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/18 (Vol. I) (1999) [hereinafter ICCPR Status
Report].
148. ICCPR Status Report, supra note 147, at 134. See also supra p. 1255
n.45 and accompanying text on reservations, understandings, declarations,
and provisos.
149. See id. at 144–48 (listing Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). See
also Schabas, supra note 59, at 277.
150. See supra text pp. 1254, 1256–59.
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Article 6 is invalid because it contradicts the ICCPR’s “object
and purpose.”151
The ICCPR, like most human rights treaties, attempts to
place legal obligations on how states handle the people living
within their borders.152 The object and purpose of the ICCPR,
and in particular Article 6, is to “protect the right to life
through prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.”153 Article 6 paragraph 5 states that the “sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.”154 The United States attached a reservation to this provision of the treaty, stating that
“the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person
[other than a pregnant woman] duly convicted under existing or
future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment
including such punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.”155 Since a reservation is invalid if
it contradicts the object and purpose of the treaty,156 the Senate
reservation, which does just that, is void.
The consequences of invalidating the reservation are two-fold.
First, if an invalid reservation can be severed from the treaty as
a whole, the United States remains bound by the entire
treaty.157 Thus in the case of the ICCPR, the United States
would be bound to the entire treaty including the prohibition
against the execution of minors who are sixteen and seventeen
at the time of their offense.158 The other possibility is that, in
light of the reservation and subsequent objections, the United

151. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 217–18. See also Schabas, supra
note 59, at 278 (citing Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee;
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) [hereinafter Comments of the Human Rights Committee regarding the ICCPR]).
152. Reimels, supra note 5, at 321.
153. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 218.
154. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 5.
155. Senate Report, supra note 30, at 653.
156. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 19. See also the accompanying text.
157. Schabas, supra note 59, at 278. See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 320.
158. Id.
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States is no longer a party to the treaty.159 However, as a result
of the “growing international consensus that an invalid reservation is severed from the ratification”160 and the corollary concept
that the reserving State is still a party to the treaty, it can be
concluded that the United States’ present practice of imposing
capital punishment on juvenile offenders is illegal under the
ICCPR, to which the United States is still a party.
Moreover, the reservation to Article 6 of the ICCPR can be
invalidated due to the fact that it attempts to annul that nonderogable provision. Article 4 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR states
that “[n]o derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs one and
two), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under this provision.”161
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued an
opinion linking the non-derogable provisions of a treaty with
the incompatibility principle of the Law of Nations.162 That
Commission defined the incompatibility doctrine by stating that
a reservation which violates a non-derogable fundamental right
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and
therefore is not permitted.163 Further, “implicit in the … opinion
linking non-derogability and incompatibility is the view that
the compatibility requirement has greater importance in human rights treaties, where reciprocity provides no protection for
the individual against a reserving state.”164 More telling still is
that the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which was
established under the ICCPR and is another major international organization dealing with the issue of the juvenile death
penalty,165 declared the United States’ death penalty reservation
to be invalid by concluding that some components of the reser159. Id.
160. See generally Bourguignon, supra note 65. See also Belilos Case, 132
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988) (holding that if a non-essential reservation is invalid it is severed and the country
submitting the reservation is still a party to the treaty and bound by the provision without the reservation); de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 219.
161. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2.
162. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), at 23 I.L.M.
320 (1984).
163. See id. at 61, 23 I.L.M. at 341. See also supra n.67.
164. Sherman, supra note 68, at 79.
165. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 28, para. 1.
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vation may be incompatible with the non-derogable provision of
the treaty that states its object and purpose.166 In conclusion,
because the Senate’s reservation conflicts with the object and
purpose of the treaty and is in fact in derogation from a nonderogable provision it is void, thus signifying the noncompliance of United States with its international obligations
under Article 6.
b. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is Self-Executing
In addition to the reservation to Article 6(5), in which the
Senate attempted to maintain the right of the United States to
impose the juvenile death penalty, the Senate declared that the
ICCPR is non-self-executing, thus barring the use of any of the
treaty provisions as a basis for private causes of action.167 However, by applying the self-executing treaty test for multilateral
human rights treaties as well as the intent-based and justiciability doctrines identified by Professor Vazquez, it becomes
clear that the ICCPR should be categorized as a self-executing
treaty.
First, Article 6 paragraph 5 of the ICCPR is self-executing because it fulfills the conditions for multilateral human rights
treaties, requiring that the provision involve the rights and duties of individuals and that the prohibitory language be extremely clear, indicating that no further legislation is needed
for it to take effect.168 The rights of individuals involved under
this provision are those of juvenile offenders and the prohibitory
language clearly states that the death penalty “shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age.”169 Consequently, implementing legislation should not be
necessary to put into operation the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty for parties to the ICCPR.170

166. See Comments of the Human Rights Committee regarding the ICCPR,
supra note 151, at 3. See also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 767 (citing de la Vega, supra note 76, at 461).
167. See ICCPR Senate Report, supra note 30, at 659. See also Reimels,
supra note 5, at 322.
168. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 220.
169. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5. See also id.
170. See de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221.
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Further, under the intent-based self-executing treaty doctrine,171 both the actual language and the meaning of the
ICCPR, in addition to the surrounding circumstances of executing the treaty when the language is unclear, make it selfexecuting.172 Article 2 paragraph 3(a) of the ICCPR states that,
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: [t]o
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”173 United States Senate Declaration
1 of the ICCPR states that, “the provisions of articles 1 through
27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”174 Due to the fact
that Article 2 of the ICCPR mandates that the United States
create a system of enforcement, the Senate’s declaration, which
lacks the full authority of a reservation,175 does not alleviate this
obligation.176
171. See Section II.A.3 supra for an in depth explanation of the several selfexecuting treaty doctrines set forth by Professor Vazquez.
172. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (noting that interpretation of a treaty must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in
which words are written and used (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S.
49, 53–54 (1963))); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,
431–32, (1943) (stating that courts should interpret treaties more liberally
than private agreements and that the Court may look at history, negotiations,
and practical construction so as to maintain the spirit of the treaty). See also
Levesque, supra note 129, at 772.
173. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 3(a).
174. ICCPR Status Report, supra note 147, declaration 1, at 139. “Declarations are simply statements of policy, purpose, or position relating to the subject matter of the treaty, but not necessarily affecting its provisions.” de la
Vega, supra note 76, at 452.
175. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64. “The declaration has effect only insofar
as it bears upon judicial appraisal of the Covenant’s force. This appraisal is
not a fait accompli; it is not clear how much weight the Senate’s declaration
will carry on the courts.” Id. See, e.g., Power Authority of N.Y. v. Federal
Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that a qualification
statement made by the Senate in a resolution of consent to a treaty, but not
made as a reservation, did not have the force of domestic law in the United
States).
176. Id. See also ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 3(b) (the parties agree
to provided remedies enforceable “by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by
the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibility of judicial remedy”). Additionally, because the United States has not created an enforcement mechanism in other branches of the government, the judiciary is “called
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The ICCPR cannot be internationally binding and contain
language invoking a remedy for individual violations and yet
not create a basis for implementation domestically.177 However,
since a discrepancy between the language and interpreted
meaning of the ICCPR is created when reading the Senate’s
Declaration in conjunction with Article 2, courts must look for
intrinsic evidence surrounding the treaty’s execution to determine whether the treaty provision is in fact self-executing.178
While the Senate’s Declaration that the treaty is non-selfexecuting carries weight, the force ascribed to the ICCPR by
other states provides substantial support to the notion that the
parties to the treaty intended for it to be self-executing.179 For
instance, the United Kingdom, a party to the ICCPR, has permitted private causes of action under the treaty even though it
has not expressly written the ICCPR into its domestic law as
British law requires.180 Moreover, many other countries which
are a party to the treaty have expressed the view that the
ICCPR creates rights that are enforceable without enacting legislation.181 Therefore, it is readily apparent that the other party
states believe that direct causes of action are allowed under the
ICCPR. Admittedly, under the Restatement approach to treaty
interpretations, the only intention considered in determining
upon to enforce the ICCPR’s obligations. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64. Professor Quigley opines that the courts should decide on this basis that the prescriptive provisions of the Covenant are self-executing.” Id.
177. Levesque, supra note 129, at 773.
178. Id.
179. See Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.
180. Id. In the United Kingdom treaties are not the “law of the land,” as
they are here under the Supremacy Clause. Instead, there, a treaty must be
explicitly transformed into law by an act of parliament in order to become
domestic law. See also supra n.75.
181. Id. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at para. 194 (Netherlands stating that “any legislative act contrary to a provision of the Covenant would become inapplicable”);
id. para. 549 (Italy stating that the ICCPR is frequently invoked by their
courts). Report on the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, para. 368, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (France stating that its
courts rely on the ICCPR); id. at para. 588 (Japan stating that the ICCPR
prevails over domestic legislation in Japanese courts). See also Cindy A. Cohn,
The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights
Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q.
295, 317–20 (1991).
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the self-executing question is that of the United States.182 However, “it is questionable [as to whether] in multilateral agreements the intent of only one of the parties … determine[s] the
effect of a particular clause.”183 Further, under the rule promulgated in Foster v. Nelson,184 which introduced the concept of the
self-executing treaty doctrine, the intent of all the negotiating
parties is most important; under that theory it would be clear
that the ICCPR is self-executing.
Moreover, the ICCPR should also be classified as selfexecuting under the justiciability doctrine introduced by Professor Vazquez. Under this doctrine, the self-executing question is
determined based on independent factors and reasons, unrelated to intent, that illustrate why the treaty should or should
not be judicially enforceable without implementing legislation.185
These factors were fashioned by the court in Frolova v. USSR186
and should act as a guideline and not a rigid test of selfexecution.187 However, by applying the factors to Article 6 paragraph 5 of the ICCPR they lead to the conclusion that it is selfexecuting. First, the language, object, and purpose of the treaty
in its entirety are clear: it intends to protect the human rights
of individuals.188 Second, as noted before, the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the treaty indicate that it is selfexecuting due to the fact that many parties to the ICCPR have
allowed private rights of action under the treaty without first
enacting implementing legislation.189 Third, Article 2 unmistakably imposes an obligation on party states to supply effective
remedies.190 Fourth, because the United States has not ratified
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Civil and Political
182. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt.h. See also Reimels, supra
note 5, at 322.
183. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 448. See also United States v. Toscanino,
550 F.2d 267, 270 (2d. Cir. 1974).
184. Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 51 (1833).
185. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 711.
186. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1985). For a more in-depth discussion of the factors see n.96 on p. 1264.
187. Levesque, supra note 129, at 772.
188. See ICCPR, supra note 4. See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055.
189. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64. See also supra n.180 and accompanying
text.
190. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 3. See also de la Vega, supra note
65, at 1055.
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Rights, which provides for an individual right to petition the
Human Rights Committee,191 there are no other enforcement or
implementation mechanisms available.192 Fifth, since the treaty
provides rights to individuals, there is no reason to “believe that
individuals should not have a private cause of action to enforce
the provisions.”193 Lastly, as there is no other enforcement
mechanism in any other branch of the United States government, this job falls to the judiciary.194 The judiciary is the most
capable institution for addressing the question of whether a
treaty has been violated because it has customarily been the
means through which individuals in the United States have
enforced their constitutional rights.195 Thus, under the Frolova
factors of the justiciability variant of the self executing treaty
doctrine, the ICCPR should be self-executing.196
Furthermore, despite the clarity of the ICCPR provisions, if
the Senate Declaration that the treaty is non-self-executing is
given effect then it should only apply to private causes of action.
When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared the
ICCPR to be non-self-executing, it did so only with respect “to
191. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; not in force for the United
States), 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
192. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055
193. Id.
194. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.
195. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055. It is important to remember that
the courts and not the Senate usually decide when treaty provisions are selfexecuting. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human
Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 42–47 (1992); Damrosch, supra note 126, at 526; David Weissbrodt,
The United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 35, 67 (1978).
196. While they are somewhat weaker arguments, the ICCPR might also be
considered self-executing under the constitutionality and private right of action self-executing treaty doctrines. First, under the constitutionality doctrine, banning the execution of minors does not appear to be a goal that lies
exclusively within the lawmaking powers of Congress. Therefore, under that
limited doctrine the ICCPR may be self executing. Secondly, while the concepts of a private right of action and the self-execution of a treaty are distinct,
according to Professor Vazquez, one can consider the provision of a private
right of action through a treaty informative regarding its self-executing nature. The ICCPR appears to provide a private right of action, thus it should
be considered self-executing. For more information regarding these variants
on the self-executing treaty doctrine, see supra Section II.A.3.
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private causes of action.”197 The legislative history of the declaration does not make the same statement regarding the use of
the ICCPR provisions as a defense; thus because a party seeking to invoke the treaty provision, such as Article 6 paragraph
5, is not invoking a separate cause of action, the non-selfexecuting declaration is inapplicable to such parties.198 Human
rights treaties are different from other treaties in that parties
to human rights treaties agree to protect individuals within
their jurisdictions, whereas parties to other treaties create state
to state obligations;199 therefore, if a right is created in a human
rights treaty but there is no corresponding private right of action to enforce it domestically then there will be an individual
right without a remedy — that is unless the treaty can be used
defensively. Moreover, “the defensive use of a treaty is a judicially accepted means by which litigants have been successful in
enforcing treaty provisions without [forcing the courts] to determine whether the treaty is self-executing.”200 Accordingly,
197. S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (“For the
reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to clarify
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.”).
See also Levesque, supra note 129, at 775.
198. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 763.
199. Id.
200. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221. The seminal case regarding
this theory is United States v. Rauscher, in which the Supreme Court “implicitly held that a direct beneficiary of a treaty may invoke that treaty as a defense even if the defendant was an unintended beneficiary or the treaty does
not expressly grant the defendant or individuals in his class any rights.”
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 432–33 (1886) (The defendant had
been extradited from Great Britain to the United States for allegedly murdering a crewmember aboard an American vessel. However, when he was
brought to the United States he was not charged with murder but with inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon a crew member.). There the Court
focused on the defendant’s use of the extradition treaty as a defense and only
indirectly discussed the issue of self-executing treaties. Id. at 420. The Court
held that treaties confer certain rights on private citizens when the treaty
prescribes a rule governing a right that is “of the nature” of rights enforceable
in the courts. Id. at 419. Thus the defendant had a right to raise the treaty
as a defense because the Court did not have jurisdiction over those offenses
that fell beyond the scope of the treaty under which he was extradited. Id. at
430. Further, even the dissent in Rauscher supported the contention that an
individual may raise a treaty as a defense to a prosecution; it only disagreed
with the actual interpretation of the treaty in question in the case. Id. at 434
(Waite, C.J., dissenting). See also Levesque, supra note 129, at 777.
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juvenile offenders sentenced to death should be allowed to use
Article 6 paragraph 5 of the ICCPR as a defense to challenge
the imposition of the juvenile death penalty.
Thus, since the Senate reservation to Article 6 paragraph 5 of
the ICCPR is invalid based on the fact that it conflicts with the
object and purpose of the treaty and the fact that the Senate
Declaration of non-self-execution is both contrary to the intent
of the parties and inapplicable when the treaty is invoked as a
defense, the ICCPR should be called upon in cases dealing with
the juvenile death penalty. Without bypassing the Senate reservation and declaration, the United States adherence to the
ICCPR remains essentially empty by keeping United States
judges from ruling on domestic human rights conditions using
the more stringent international standards.201
2. The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War
The first treaty that the United States ratified that explicitly
prohibited the application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders was the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention).202 The Fourth Geneva Conventions are the most
widely ratified treaties in the history of the modern world.203
The United States is a party to this treaty which was both
signed and ratified in 1949.204 Article 68 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that “[i]n any case, the death penalty may
not be pronounced against a protected person [held by a party
to the conflict or an occupying force of which he or she is not a
national] who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the
offence [sic].”205 While the Fourth Geneva Convention applies
only in times of international armed conflict, it is important to
note that it prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders. The
United States did submit a reservation to Article 68,206 but in201. Henkin, supra note 59, at 346.
202. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68.
203. See Reimels, supra note 5, at 322. 186 States are parties to the 1949
Geneva Convention. Id.
204. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68.
205. Id.
206. Schabas, supra note 59, at 305–06. Article 68, paragraph 2 stating
that the death penalty “may not be imposed in wartime on civilian popula-
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terestingly it was not to the prohibition of the juvenile death
penalty.207
Additionally, the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
explicitly prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on those
who committed the crimes that they were convicted of while
they were minors under the age of eighteen.208 The Additional
Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) states in Article 77 paragraph 5
that “the death penalty related to the armed conflict shall not
be executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offence [sic] was committed.”209 The
Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Nontions by an occupying power if it has previously been abolished in peacetime”
has been the only provision in the Fourth Geneva Convention to provoke reservations. Id. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68
para. 2. Reservations were filed by the United States, Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Netherlands for the purpose of protecting “… the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offenses referred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins.” Id. at 432.
207. Id. This may have been due to the fact that at the time of the signing
and ratification of the Geneva Convention the United States federal government had a de facto moratorium on its use of the death penalty against juvenile offenders. See Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban
on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1332
(1993). See also VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 55 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press) (1987). Additionally, it was not until
1962 that the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1318. Therefore, until that time the state supreme courts
heard most, if not all challenges to the death penalty. Id. Then, significantly,
between 1964 and 1985, the United States did not execute any persons for
crimes committed while under eighteen years of age. Id.
208. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 77, para. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978; not in force in the United States); Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977,
art. 6, para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 613–14 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978; not
in force in the United States) [hereinafter Protocol II]. See also Nanda, supra
note 207, at 1330.
209. Id. at art 77, para 5, at 39.
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International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) states in Article 6
paragraph 4 that “the death penalty shall not be pronounced on
persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of
the offence [sic] ….”210 Despite the United States’ tacit endorsement of the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty
by ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention, it did not become a
party to the Additional Protocols of 1977.211 While the Fourth
Geneva Convention, to which the United States is a party, only
applies to times of international armed conflict and the Additional Protocols of 1997 were not accepted by the United States,
the provisions within those instruments dealing with the juvenile death penalty illustrate the international consensus for the
prohibition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.212
3. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) is the first international human rights treaty specifically
devoted to children.213 On November 20, 1989, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the CRC,214 a treaty that
consists of fifty-four articles and provides the children of the
international community with “civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights.”215 The United States signed the CRC in
February of 1995216 and is one of only two counties worldwide,
the other being Somalia — a country without a government,

210. Protocol II, supra note 208, art. 6, para. 4, at 613–14.
211. Id. See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 324–25.
212. This will be very important in the later discussion of customary international law and jus cogens norms. See infra pp. 1288–1298.
213. Jennifer D. Tinkler, Note, The Juvenile Justice System in the United
States and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 469, 470 (1992). See also Per Miljeteig-Olssen, Advocacy of
Children’s Rights – The Convention as More than a Legal Document, 12 HUM.
RTS. Q.148, 148 (1990).
214. The treaty came into force on September 2, 1990. CRC, supra note 4,
at 44 n.1.
215. Tinkler, supra note 213, at 469. See also Michael Jupp, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: An opportunity for Advocates, 12 HUM. RTS.
Q. 130, 130 (1990).
216. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, Feb.
10, 1995. See also de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 224.
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which has not yet ratified the treaty.217 The sentiment reflected
in the CRC is “that every child deprived of liberty be treated in
a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his
or her age [and] calls for a variety of dispositions in criminal
convictions that ensure children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being [that is] proportionate to the circumstances of their offense.”218
Article 37 of the CRC specifies the rights that children enjoy
when they are deprived of their liberty, including rights granted
to children after they are convicted or adjudicated delinquent.219
That provision of the CRC explicitly abolishes capital punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of release
for juvenile offenders.220 Article 37 section (a) states that “[n]o
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of parole shall
be imposed for offences [sic] committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”221 Further, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention requires a government that has signed, but not yet ratified,
a treaty “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of [the] treaty … until it shall have made its intentions
clear not to become a party.”222 Similarly, under the Restatement “[p]rior to the entry into force of an international agreement, a state that has signed the agreement or expressed its
consent to be bound is obliged to refrain from acts that would
defeat the object and purpose of the agreement.”223 Therefore,
217. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 753. See also Rights of the
Child: Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. ESCOR,
Commision on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 2, Annex I, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/74 (2000).
218. Barbra Frey, International Standards and the Execution of Juvenile
Defendants, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 261, 262 (1994).
219. Tinkler, supra note 213, at 476.
220. Hancock, supra note 127, at 699.
221. CRC, supra note 4, at art. 37(a), at 55.
222. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 18(a). As mentioned before,
while the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention the
RESTATEMENT has adopted most of the language of the treaty. See supra text
accompanying n.36. Therefore, Article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention applies
to the CRC.
223. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 312(a) & cmt. i. But see RESTATEMENT,
supra note 36, § 312 cmt. d (stating that signatures are subject to later ratification of the treaty and thus have no binding effect on the State; however,
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the United States is obligated to adhere to the object and purpose of the CRC to protect the youth from harm including that
of the most severe kind — the death penalty. 224
Moreover, it is significant that during the drafting of the
CRC, there were four areas covered in the treaty that were considered controversial issues in the international community;
those issues included “the rights of the unborn child, the right
to foster care and adoption, freedom of religion, and the minimum age for participation in armed conflict.”225 The juvenile
death penalty was noticeably lacking in that list of controversial
issues.226 Thus, in considering the large number of states that
have ratified and actively observed the CRC, in addition to the
fact that as a signatory to the treaty the United States has an
obligation to uphold its principles, this treaty should also be
applicable as a defense to criminal prosecutions of juvenile defendants. Further, this international consensus gives even
more credence to the notion that the United States is violating
customary international law because the juvenile death penalty
is contrary to the practices of most other states.
4. The American Declaration of Human Rights
The last treaty to be examined in this Comment is the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).227
This agreement was adopted in 1970228 and states, in pertinent
they are considered to represent political approval and at least a moral obligation to ratify and adhere to the treaty by not passing domestic laws adverse to
its object and purpose).
224. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 224. Furthermore, the death
penalty differs from all other types of criminal punishment, not in degree but
in kind. Tinkler, supra note 213, at 494. It is unique in its total irrevocability, it is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict (which is central
to juvenile justice) and it is unique in its absolute renunciation of all that is
embodied in our concept of humanity. Id. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus we must be extra careful
when attempting to impose the death penalty on minors, who by the very
nature of their age, are not assumed to have the maturity to be held liable for
all of their actions.
225. Cynthia Price Cohen, United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the
Child: Introductory Note, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1450 (1989).
226. Reimels, supra note 5, at 323–24.
227. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5.
228. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records,
OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1 corr. 2 (1970).
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part, that “[c]apital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18
years of age ….”229 Despite being heavily involved in the drafting of the agreement the United States is one of only two members of the Organization of American States (OAS), which is
made up of twenty-four member states,230 that has signed but
not yet ratified the American Convention.231 During the drafting phase, the United States did not object to the prohibition of
the execution of juvenile offenders in the American Convention.232 Instead, the United States argued against setting a specific age limit because of the “already existent trend” toward the
abolition of the death penalty altogether.233 Due to the fact that
the drafting Conference would not remove the proscription of
capital punishment for certain age groups the United States
abstained on Article 4, which dealt with the juvenile death penalty.234 Interestingly, of the twenty-four OAS member States
only Barbados made a reservation to Article 4(5), and even they
“brought themselves into line” in 1994.235
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Inter-American Commission), which was established under the
229. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5, at 146.
230. The Organization of American States maintains a list of signatories
and ratifications to the American Convention, available at http://www.oas.org
(last visited on Apr. 16, 2004).
231. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1046.
232. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of Petitioner, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
233. Id. See also Nanda, supra note 207, at 1328.
234. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1329. See also American Convention on
Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. K/XVI 1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1
con. 1 (1970).
235. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1046. When Barbados ratified the American Convention in 1982, it made a reservation to article 4, paragraph 5 stating that “while youth or old age may be factors to be considered by the Privy
Council in deciding whether the death penalty should be carried out, Barbadian legislation allowed the execution of persons over sixteen and set no upper
age limit.” Schabas, supra note 59, at 303. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago
ratified the American Convention with a reservation to article 4, paragraph 5
noting that its laws do not prohibit the execution of a person over age seventy.
Id. at 304. Significantly, Professor Schabas points out that the reservations
by Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago only attempted “to account for existing
legislation not in line with the international obligations being undertaken,
[they were] not aimed at preserving a state’s freedom to maneuver on the
question [of the death penalty] in the future.” Id.

File: Jen4.23.04macro.doc

2004]

Created on: 4/23/2004 10:23 PM

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 1:25 PM

MINORS AND THE DEATH PENALTY

1287

American Convention and is another branch of the OAS,236 has
ruled on the juvenile death penalty in the United States. While
the United States is not party to the American Convention, it is
still subject to the provisions of the American Declaration of
Human Rights and the recommendations of the Inter-American
Commission because it is a member of the OAS as well as a signatory of the Charter of the OAS.237 The Inter-American Commission was concerned with the differences in United States
state laws regarding the execution of minors and ruled that “by
leaving [these] decisions … to state legislatures, the United
States [was creating] a patchwork pattern of legislation whose
arbitrariness violated [the] rights to life and equality before the
law.”238 Indeed, the Inter-American Commission in 1987 found
that the United States was in violation of a rule of jus cogens by
its practice of executing juvenile offenders.239
Therefore, in examining the four treaties that the United
States has either ratified — the ICCPR and the Fourth Geneva
Convention — or signed — the CRC and the American Conven236. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American
Commission) is the body responsible for the protection of fundamental freedoms, through the implementation of the American Declaration, in the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member. de la
Vega, supra note 65, at 1045. See also American Convention, supra note 4, at
arts. 52–73 (discussing how the Commission has dealt with the United State’s
practice of executing juvenile offenders). Id.
237. Schabas, supra note 59, at 323.
238. Quigley, supra note 141, at 75. See also Terry Roach and Jay
Pinkerton v. United States, Res. No. 3/87, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 925th
Sess., Mar. 27, 1987. This case involved the executions of James Terry Roach
and Jay Pinkerton who were both seventeen at the time of their crimes. Mr.
Roach and Mr. Pinkerton filed a complaint requesting the Inter-American
Commission consider whether their impending executions violated the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man prohibiting the execution of
juveniles. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 765. The Inter-American
Commission was most concerned with the fact that each state had its own
laws on capital punishment and minimum ages therfor and thus stated that
the inconsistent sentencing reflected the location of the crime more than its
nature. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1330. “Although the Commission did not
determine whether the United States had violated customary international
law or was bound by article 4 paragraph 5 of the American Convention, the
Commission did find that the United States practice violated a newly emerged
peremptory norm of international law.” de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50,
at 765.
239. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 765.
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tion — there appears to be a substantial international consensus advocating for the abolition of the use of capital punishment
on juvenile offenders. To that end, part III of this Comment
will now focus on examining the international consensus banning the juvenile death penalty.
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY HAS REACHED THE LEVEL OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAY HAVE EVEN REACHED THE
LEVEL OF A JUS COGENS NORM
A. Customary International Law as Applied to the Juvenile
Death Penalty
Customary international law is “an emerging form of international law and is considered by some to be the equivalent [of]
treaty law or federal common law.”240 It is defined as law that
“results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”241 Human
rights obligations in customary international law generally are
obligations to other countries for the benefit of individuals including nationals, residents, and others subject to the jurisdiction of the promisor country.242 Moreover, the customary international law of human rights is part of the law of the United
States and must be applied as such by both the state and federal courts.243 In order for a treaty obligation to evolve to the
level of customary international law, the treaty clause must be
a norm creating provision or one which has generated a rule
that has since passed into the general corpus of international
law, such that it is binding even for countries which are not a

240. Hancock, supra note 127, at 718.
241. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102(2). The practice of the states referred to in §102(2) that is necessary to create customary international law
may be of comparatively short duration, but it must be “general and consistent.” Id. §102 cmt. b. A practice can be general even if it is not universally
followed and there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice
must be, “but it should reflect a wide acceptance among the states particularly
involved in the relevant activity.” Id. (emphasis added). If a significant number of states do not adopt the practice it may be prevented from becoming
general customary international law. Id.
242. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 701 cmt. c.
243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 702 cmt. e.
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party to the treaty.244 Thus, there are two criteria that must be
fulfilled before a provision is considered customary law: (1) the
provision or prohibition must be state practice evidenced by
long-term, widespread compliance by many states; and (2) the
provision or prohibition must be opinio juris, meaning that
states must believe that compliance with the standard is not
merely desired but is mandatory and required by international
law.245
Enough evidence exists to deem the prohibition on imposing
capital punishment on juvenile offenders a customary international law norm.246 The first element of the customary international law doctrine, state practice, which requires widespread
acceptance of the abolition of capital punishment for juvenile
offenders, is easily established by the fact that scarcely any
countries in the world currently retain the juvenile death penalty.247 Only eight countries worldwide have executed juvenile
offenders since 1990; those countries include China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Iran, and the United States.248 Besides those nations,
244. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Dem; F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3. The passage cited to was from the International Court
of Justices case and was referring to Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of
1958 regarding the principal of equidistance. See also Reimels, supra note 5,
at 329.
245. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 756. See also Lynn Loschin, The
Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical
Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 148, 148 (1996).
246. Id. at 757.
247. See id. See also Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today:
Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 – December 31, 2003, (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.law.onu.
edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). One-hundredseventeen countries are abolitionists either by law or by practice, whereas
only seventy-eight countries are retentionist with regard to the death penalty
(and only eight countries practice the juvenile death penalty). Amnesty International, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries
(Feb. 1, 2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/005/2004), available at http://www.web
.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500052004?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
248. See Amnesty International, Stop Child Executions! Ending the Death
Penalty for Child Offenders (Jan. 2, 2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/001/2004), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500012004?open (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004). See also Juvenile Death Penalty in Other Countries,
Death Penalty Info. Center (Aug. 30, 2002), available at http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/juvintl.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Amnesty Interna-
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all other countries have either de facto abolished the juvenile
death penalty or enacted legislation to prohibit the execution of
juvenile offenders.249 The United Nations reported that Yemen,
Barbados, and Zimbabwe changed their law and increased the
death penalty age to eighteen in 1994,250 and China and Nigeria
followed suit in 1997.251 Pakistan promulgated the Juvenile
Justice System Ordinance in July of 2000 and in 2001, in furtherance of the new law banning the death penalty for anyone
under eighteen at the time of the crime, Pakistan’s President
Musharraf commuted the death sentences of one-hundred
young offenders to imprisonment.252
Significantly, even though there have been recent reports of
juvenile offender executions in Pakistan (1 in 2001), Nigeria (1
in 1997), Saudi Arabia (1 in 1992), the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (1 in 2000), Iran (1 in 2004), and China (1 in 2003),253
most if not all of these countries have either adamantly denied
any execution took place or that a minor was sentenced to
death.254 These denials are so important because they “indicate
tional, Democratic Republic of Congo: Killing Human Decency 12 (2000) (AI
Index: AFR 62/007/2000), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr620072000?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
249. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 222.
250. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Capital Punishment and the
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of
Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
ESCOR, Subst. Sess., para. 21, 90, U.N. Doc. E/2000/3 (2000).
251. Id.
252. See Amnesty International, Report 2001 186 (2001) (AI Index: POL
10/001/2001); Juvenile Justice Systems Ordinance 2000, available at
http://1hrla.sdnpk.org/link/jul_oct00/JUVENILE _ORDINANCE.HTML (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004). See also Press Release, Amnesty International Irish
Section, Pakistan: Young Offenders Taken Off Death Row (Dec. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.amnesty.ie/new/2001/pakistan4.shtml (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004).
253. Amnesty International, Children and the Death Penalty: Executions
Worldwide Since 1990 (2002) (AI Index: ACT 50/007/2002), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500072002?open (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004).
254. See Amnesty International, Children and the Death Penalty: Executions Worldwide Since 1990 (2000) (AI Index: ACT 50/010/2000), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500102002?open (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004). See also United Press International, May 29, 2001 (AI Index:
ACT 53/003/2001), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/
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that those countries have in fact accepted the customary international norm” prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.255
Hence, only the United States has not accepted the norm
against the execution of juvenile offenders,256 thus the first criterion of state practice is satisfied.
The second criterion for customary international law demands that nations prohibiting the juvenile death penalty do so
because they believe that such a proscription is mandatory and
required by customary international law.257 This second element, opinio juris, is more complicated but possible to establish.258 As discussed above, at least four international agreements expressly prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders: the
ICCPR Article 6 paragraph 5, the Fourth Geneva Convention
Article 68, the CRC Article 37, and the American Convention

engact530032001?open, (regarding the execution of a minor in Iran in 2001)
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Amnesty International, Report 2002 (May 28,
2002) (AI Index: POL 10/001/002), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/
library/index/engpol10001002?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
255. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1047.
256. Capital punishment has been abolished in the United States in thirteen states. Streib, supra note 247, at 8. However, forty jurisdictions in the
United States still authorize the death penalty for capital crimes. Id. at 7. Of
those forty jurisdictions consisting of thirty-eight states and the federal government (both civilian and military) authorizing the death penalty, nineteen
jurisdictions (48%) have expressly mandated that a criminal must be eighteen
years-of-age at the time that they committed the crime to be sentenced to
death. Id. The other twenty-one death penalty jurisdictions permit the execution of individuals who were convicted of crimes they committed while they
were sixteen or seventeen years-of-age. Id. However, in the United States
since 1976 when the juvenile death penalty was reintroduced to American
jurisprudence, only twenty-two people have been executed for crimes that they
committed as minors. Id. at 4. Of these twenty-two executions, Texas has
accounted for thirteen (59%), Virginia for three (14%), and Oklahoma for two
(9%). Id. at 6. Thus, these three states are responsible for 81% of all juvenile
executions and no other state has executed a criminal convicted of a crime
that they committed as a minor for the past ten years. Id. This shows that,
like the international community, there is no domestic consensus approving of
the juvenile death penalty.
257. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221–22. See also Allyssa D.
Wheaton-Rodriguez, Comment, The United States’ Choice to Violate International Law by Allowing the Juvenile Death Penalty, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 209,
214 (2001).
258. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757.
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Article 4 paragraph 5.259 With most nations having signed or
ratified one or more of those four treaties prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, it appears that the second element, demanding that nations believe their prohibitions are required by customary international law, is satisfied.260 While it is difficult to
distinguish between “those habitual practices that are regarded
as binding legal obligations [and] those [practices] that result
simply from courtesy or diplomatic protocol, or from domestic
policy considerations, and from which departure can ensue
without breach of international law,”261 sentiments expressed by
states when they are preparing treaties are excellent indicators
of the parties’ view of the law.262 Therefore, because multilateral
treaties in general, and more importantly human rights treaties, clearly enunciate the intentions of the drafters — the countries of the world — their provisions can be interpreted to consist of globally approved international law.263
Moreover, in addition to proof of customary international law
through treaties, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have
both stated that there is a customary international norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, though both groups were
hesitant in setting the minimum age at eighteen.264 Even
though the United States filed a reservation to the relevant
provision in the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights

259. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 5; Geneva Convention, supra note 4,
art. 68; CRC, supra note 4, art. 37; American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4,
para. 5.
260. Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 215.
261. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1333. See also de la Vega & Brown, supra
note 50, at 757.
262. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757. For instance, when the
ICCPR was being prepared the parties to it expressed their opinions concerning the juvenile death penalty when they asked the question “what is the
source of the nations’ disinclination to execute juvenile offenders other than a
shared sense of the moral reprehensiveness of the practice?” Nanda, supra
note 207, at 1334. See also Joan F. Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death
Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 671 (1983).
263. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757.
264. See Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 215; William A. Schabas,
International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
797, 813 (1998).
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Committee concluded that said reservation was invalid.265 Subsequently, on May 3, 2001, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee voted to unseat the United States from itself.266 This
is even further evidence of a worldwide customary international
law norm, banning the juvenile death penalty, which is observed by almost every other country except for the United
States.
Furthermore, the United States is not a persistent objector so
it cannot evade its responsibilities under customary international law to abstain from executing juvenile offenders. While
persistent objectors cannot prevent the development of customary international law norms by the rest of the world, those
norms do not bind the State that has persistently objected to
them.267 This doctrine allows a “state to avoid being involuntarily subjected to a rule it finds unacceptable” but it does not
permit “a state to reap the benefits of being a party to a treaty
without having to conform to its terms and undergo domestic
change.”268 However, a country cannot use the persistent objector doctrine to make reservations, declarations, understandings,
or provisos to treaties with which it suddenly disagrees.269
The United States is not a persistent objector to the practice
of executing juveniles for the following reasons: (1) the United
States did not object to the prohibition when drafting, signing,
and ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention, (2), the United
States did not object to the prohibition in the ICCPR during its
drafting and signing, (3) the United States did not object to the
prohibition at the drafting and signing of the American Convention and, (4) the United States signed the CRC which contained
the prohibition.270 Significantly, during the drafting of the
265. See supra pp. 1271–75 on the invalidation of the United States reservation to the ICCPR.
266. See Thalif Deen, Politics: U.S. Ouster from Rights Body Reflects Hostility, Int’l Press Serv., May 4, 2001, available at 2001 WL 20829289. This could
have been due, in part, to the United States disregard for international treaties and the United Nations as evidenced by its conduct during the ratification
process of the ICCPR. See generally Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257.
267. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.
268. Sherman, supra note 68, at 91.
269. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.
270. Id. See also Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 217. The United
States could say that it has been a persistent objector to the norm prohibiting
the execution of juvenile offenders due to its ratification of the ICCPR with a
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American Convention the United States not only failed to object
to the prohibition but argued that setting a specific age limit
went against the “already existent trend toward the abolition of
the death penalty altogether.”271 Even more important is the
fact that the United States only resurrected the juvenile death
penalty after signing the ICCPR and before filing a reservation
to Article 6 paragraph 5.272 While a treaty does not become the
law of the land until it is ratified, by signing the ICCPR the
United States was agreeing to try and follow its provisions and
not pass contradictory laws; thus the United States’ reservation
is invalid and of no value to the argument that the United
States is a persistent objector to the norm.273
Therefore, “it is fair to argue that under evolving international standards, there is an emerging customary international
law under which capital punishment of juveniles is prohibited.”274 Due to the fact that the United States is not a persistent objector, because it has not consistently disavowed the
prohibition, it should be held to the customary international
law standard concerning the execution of juvenile offenders and
is thus in violation of that law.
B. The Prohibition Against the Juvenile Death Penalty Has
Reached the Level of a Jus Cogens Norm
Even if considered to be a persistent objector to an emerging
rule of customary international law prohibiting the execution of
minors, the United States is still bound by established norms of
juvenile death penalty reservation, its refusal to ratify the American Covenant without a juvenile death penalty reservation, and its refusal to ratify the
CRC. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758. However, the better argument is that the United States has not been a persistent objector at all. Id. It
is particularly important to note that at the time of the negotiation, drafting,
and opening for signature of the ICCPR, the Protocols to the Geneva Convention, and the American Convention the United States had discontinued its use
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Id. See also Nanda, supra note
207, at 1332. Therefore, “if indeed the prohibition against the juvenile death
penalty is customary international law, under any reading of U.S. practice in
this area [the United States is not a persistent objector.]” de la Vega &
Brown, supra note 50, at 758.
271. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1329.
272. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.
273. Id. at 759. See also supra n.138.
274. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1328.
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jus cogens.275 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines jus
cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”276 Jus cogens norms are distinguished from ordinary international law because jus cogens are “based on natural law
propositions applicable to all legal systems, all persons, or the
system of international law.”277 Thus these norms cannot be
avoided by a persistent objector state and they prevail over any
The Restatement
conflicting international rule of law.278
adopted the Vienna Convention definition and added that
“these rules prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with
them.”279 Thus, it follows that jus cogens norms are so important, both internationally and nationally, that they could also
invalidate conflicting domestic laws.280 Moreover, Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention sets out four criteria for identifying peremptory norms (jus cogens norms): the norm is (1) one of general international law; (2) accepted by the international community as a whole; (3) immune from derogation; and (4) modifiable only by a new norm having the same status.281
The prohibition of the juvenile death penalty satisfies the
four criteria and therefore reaches the level of a jus cogens
norm. First, the prohibition against the imposition of capital
punishment on a juvenile offender has become a norm of general international law; as discussed above, treaty law,282 decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and

275. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759. See also Sherman, supra
note 68, at 74.
276. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 53.
277. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759 (quoting Johnathan A.
Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 541 (1993)).
278. Id. at 759–60.
279. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102 cmt. k.
280. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 760.
281. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 53. See also de la Vega &
Fiore, supra note 138, at 225.
282. See supra pp. 1291–94 and corresponding footnotes concerning treaty
law supporting the concept that the prohibition against the juvenile death
penalty has become a customary international law norm.
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the United Nations Human Rights Committee,283 and resolutions passed by the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights and the United Nations General Assembly284 exemplify
the sentiments of the majority of the world that the juvenile
death penalty is a norm from which there can be no derogation.
Second, the fact that only eight countries have executed juvenile offenders within the last fourteen years is extremely strong
evidence that a very large majority of nations have accepted the
prohibition as a norm.285 The Restatement further explained
this criterion by requiring that the norm “be accepted and recognized by a very large majority of states even if over dissent by
a very small number of states.”286 As previously discussed, the
United States is alone, as it is the only nation worldwide to not
just allow for the execution of juvenile offenders but to also
show no remorse in light of worldwide consensus against the
practice.287 Furthermore, while United States courts have found
that the prohibition against torture has attained the status of a
jus cogens norm,288 over one-hundred-twenty-five countries have

283. See supra n.264 and corresponding text.
284. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights passed resolutions
calling on states to abolish the death penalty generally and has specifically
asked countries not to impose it on juvenile offenders. de la Vega, supra note
65, at 1044. See, e.g., The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 58th Sess., Res. 2002/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/22
(2002). Similarly in 1985 the United Nations General Assembly, by consensus, adopted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, know as the “Beijing Rules,” which also prohibited the execution of juvenile offenders. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1044.
See also G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 53, at 207,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
285. See supra pp. 1288–91 and corresponding footnotes dealing with international death penalty statistics proving the worldwide acceptance of the
prohibition of the juvenile death penalty.
286. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102 reporter’s note 6.
287. See text and footnotes discussing international death penalty statistics
supra pp. 1288–91. See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1047.
288. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that torture was a violation of jus cogens but that because the
violation was committed by a government outside of the United States, there
was no jurisdiction over Argentina under an exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). The Court also observed that “because jus cogens
norms do not depend solely on the consent of states for their binding force,
they ‘enjoy the highest status within international law.” For example, a
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violated that norm in 2001.289 By contrast, only three countries
have violated the norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty
in the past year.290 Third, the prohibition against the execution
of juvenile offenders is a non-derogable norm.291 The ICCPR in
Article 4 stated that there was to be “[n]o derogation from articles 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, and 18 … under [that] provision.”292 Thus
the international intent for the prohibition against the death
penalty for juvenile offenders is per se non-derogable.293 Finally,
there is no emerging norm, of the same status as that of the
prohibition of the execution of juvenile offenders, which contradicts or modifies this current norm.294
Additional factors relevant to the determination of whether
there is a jus cogens norm prohibiting the execution of juvenile
offenders include the strength and conviction of the supporting
states and the significance of the opposing states.295 The juvenile death penalty appears to be a perfect example of a jus cogens norm because such an overwhelming majority of the countries support the prohibition.296 While the United States is considered a significant force in the international community, the
treaty that contravenes jus cogens is considered … to be void ….” Id. at 715.
See also de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 227–28.
289. See Amnesty International Report 2001, supra note 250. See also de la
Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.
290. See Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty
(2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/008/2004), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/
library/index/engact500082004?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Amnesty
International recorded two executions of child offenders in 2003, one of them
in China and one in the United States. Id. Another child offender was executed in Iran in January of 2004. Id. See supra pp. 1288–91 and corresponding footnotes. See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.
291. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761.
292. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4. See also de la Vega & Brown, supra note
50, at 761.
293. See de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761. This express provision
in the ICCPR, coupled with the wide acceptance of the prohibition against the
execution of juveniles, as evidenced by treaties, resolutions such as those of
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights calling for the abolition of
the death penalty (and the execution of juvenile offenders especially) and national laws and practice, all lead to the conclusion that the anti-juvenile death
penalty norm is non-derogable. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1050.
294. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.
295. Charney, supra note 277, at 542. See also de la Vega & Brown, supra
note 50, at 761.
296. See Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 212.
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fact that only three other countries have executed juvenile offenders in the past year gives tremendous weight to the argument that the opposition is insufficient to thwart the establishment of a jus cogens norm.297 Thus, the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty rises to the level of jus cogens status from which
no state can derogate.
Therefore, the treaty law dealing with the prohibition of the
execution of juvenile offenders has, at the very least, risen to
the level of customary international law and may very well even
be a jus cogens norm. As the United States has recently passed
th
the 100 anniversary of the Paquete Habana decision it is important to remember that now, more than ever, “international
law is part of our law and must be ascertained [and respected]
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”298 As such,
the United States is in violation of the international law abolishing the juvenile death penalty and should change its practices to conform to the international norms and standards and
the courts should use these laws to determine juvenile death
penalty cases like Toronto M. Patterson’s.299
IV. POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL SYSTEM MAY FACE IF IT DOES NOT CHANGE ITS
DEATH PENALTY PRACTICES.
While the United States judicial system is obligated under
Article VI Section 2 of the United States Constitution to treat
all ratified international agreements as the “supreme law of the
land”300 as well as to take into consideration the international
consensus on a subject in the form of established customary international law and/or jus cogens norms, there are other impor297. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761.
298. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (one of the most influential cases on the application of international law in our domestic courts) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Restatement provides that “[i]nternational law
and international agreements of the United States are the law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several States” and “[c]ourts in the
United States are bound to give effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102.
This principle that customary international law is a part of United States law
applies with even greater force when considering a peremptory norm, such as
the juvenile death penalty. See de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1051.
299. Patterson v. State of Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002).
300. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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tant reasons that the United States should amend its death
penalty practices. Of the multiple domestic problems which can
arise out of the practice of the United States allowing for capital
punishment, and more specifically the execution of juvenile offenders, the most troublesome is the potential inability to obtain evidence or witnesses for death penalty cases from countries that prohibit the practice. This issue has played an integral role in the recent developments of the cases against
th
Zacarias Moussaoui (the alleged twentieth September 11 hijacker) and Lee Boyd Malvo (the convicted D.C. area sniper).
With regard to the case against French national Zacarias
Moussaoui, there were recent difficulties in obtaining evidence.
French and German authorities were in possession of important
documents that could establish a link between Mr. Moussaoui
and the al Qaeda terrorist network.301 These crucial pieces of
evidence included records of money transfers from a member of
the Hamburg-based terrorist cell that carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and were vital to the prosecution’s case.302 However, the
German Constitution forbids “submission of any material that
could lead to the death penalty.”303 Since the prosecution
planned to seek capital punishment for Mr. Moussaoui, the
German government was unwilling to release the documents
that they had compiled on Mr. Moussaoui.304 Thus, from a practical standpoint, the prosecution stood the chance of having the
case dismissed or transferred to a Military Court if they could
not produce enough evidence for the criminal trial.305
Intelligence-sharing in criminal cases involving the death
penalty “has long been an issue between the United States and
its Western European Allies.”306 Fortunately, however, the
three countries involved — the United States, France, and
301. Dan Egan, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data From Europe; French, Germans
Strike Deal Barring Use of Documents to Seek Death Penalty, WASH. POST,
Nov. 28, 2002, at A19.
302. Id. See also Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Terror Suspect;
Germany Urges U.S. to Drop Death Penalty Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2002,
at A9.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. Shenon, supra note 302, at A9.
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Germany — were able to reach an agreement with regard to the
material. Germany consented to granting the United States the
evidence needed, under the condition that the United States
would not use that material to seek the death penalty.307 The
United States conceded, and, in reality, did not really give up
much except for the use of the material obtained by Germany in
the sentencing trial after Mr. Moussaui is convicted,308 but the
possible ramifications of this concession by the federal government could have disastrous effects in the future. As a result,
there is a question as to how the government will handle other
conditions on the acquisition of evidence abroad in cases where
the death penalty is sought. This uncertainty could pose an
enormous burden on prosecutors and could result in cases being
dismissed due to the inability of the prosecutor to obtain enough
evidence to make a prima facia case, even if that information is
available but located in a country with abolitionist laws. Moreover, a defendant’s procedural due process right309 could be infringed upon if the defense cannot obtain exculpatory evidence
from foreign countries that are unable or unwilling to supply
information that will be used in a trial involving capital punishment. Thus, the death penalty, regardless of the age of the
defendant to be tried, has and will continue to bar the effective
and efficient implementation of our judicial system.
In considering Lee Boyd Malvo’s case, a situation arose that
was intricately intertwined with the arguments made in this
Comment. Lee Malvo, the seventeen year old suspected “D.C.
sniper,” was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for capital murder in connection with the death of Linda Franklin, an FBI analyst who was shot and killed as she left a Home Depot™ store in

307. Egan, supra note 301, at A19.
308. Id. This of course has all become moot, at least for the moment, because presiding judge Leonie M. Brinkema has held that the government cannot seek the death penalty against Mr. Moussaoui because he was denied
access to witnesses held overseas who helped plan the September 11th attack
and under the Sixth Amendment criminal defendants are afforded the right to
confront accusers and seek out testimony that might prove their innocence.
Shenon, supra note 302, at A9. However, the Justice Department has appealed the judge’s ruling, so this issue may reappear again in the future.
Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9/11 Terror Suspect, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 2003, at A28.
309. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Virginia.310 The Court decided to try Lee Malvo as an adult and
because Virginia does not specify a minimum age in its capital
punishment statute, the seventeen year old would have to face
the death penalty if he was convicted.311 On December 18, 2003,
after deliberating for fourteen hours, the jury found Lee Malvo
“guilty of capital murder as an act of terrorism for killing
[Linda] Franklin and demanding $10 million from the government, and guilty of capital murder for killing more than one
person in three years.”312 Although the jury ultimately spared
Lee Malvo’s life,313 Lee Malvo almost joined the ranks of Toronto
M. Patterson as the newest juvenile offender sentenced to
death.
From the perspective of international law, one of the most interesting aspects of this case was the fact that Lee Malvo was
an illegal immigrant from Jamaica, who had come to the United
States with his mother Una James in late 1999 or early 2000.314
His mother was deported on November 20, 2002 after deciding
not to appeal a deportation order issued by an immigration
judge on November 19, 2002.315 This became a significant issue
during Lee Malvo’s capital murder trial and later during the
sentencing phase. Evidence and witnesses located abroad in
the Caribbean were necessary for the defense’s case.316 The defense needed the testimony of several Jamaican nationals,
friends and family of Lee Malvo, as exculpatory evidence in addition to evidence of mitigating factors that might persuade the
jury to spare Lee Malvo’s life.317 Such witnesses and evidence

310. See Stephan Kiehl, Va. Judge Bans Broadcast of Muhammad Trial; He
Will Allow Still Cameras If They Aren’t a Distraction, BALT. SUN., Dec. 13,
2002, at A14.
311. See Va. Code. Ann. § 18.2-31.
312. Tom Jackman, Malvo Guilty of Capital Murder; Sniper Trial Jury to
Choose Life or Death Sentence, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A01.
313. Tom Jackman, Malvo is Spared Death Penalty; Jury Gives Teen Life
Sentence for His Role in Sniper Slayings, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at A01.
314. See Mary Beth Sheridan & Maria Glod, Malvo’s Mother Being Deported
to Jamaica; Documents Describe Una James’s Efforts to Leave Homeland, Get
U.S. Residency, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2002, at B01.
315. Mother of Teen Suspect in Sniper Case Deported, HOUS. CHRON., Dec.
14, 2002, at A15.
316. Tom Jackman, Malvo’s Prosecutors Resist Video Testimony; Defense
Has Witnesses in Caribbean, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at B05.
317. Jackman, supra note 312, at A01.
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had to be brought to the United States, and Jamaica, a country
which does not allow for the execution of juvenile offenders,
could have refused to send the evidence or extradite the witnesses (similar to the situation in the Moussaui case). This refusal could have, in effect, crippled the defense’s efforts in effectively making a case. As it was, defense attorneys filed several
motions to either allow key witnesses into the country who were
barred from re-entry — like Lee Malvo’s mother — or to permit
the use of video conferencing for those witnesses.318 Ultimately,
the necessary witnesses were allowed to testify in court319 but if
they had not, either due to United States laws or Jamaican
laws, and no video conferencing was offered, then there would
have been a constitutional violation and possible mistrial.320
It is not unusual for the United States to seek extradition of
criminal defendants or witnesses from other countries. However, the practice of extraditing individuals on the condition
that they are not subject to capital punishment also has a long
history, originating in the mid-nineteenth century when states
began abolishing capital punishment in their domestic legal
systems.321 Several model multilateral extradition treaties, such
as Article IV of the 1990 Model Treaty on Extradition proposed
by the Eighth United Nation’s Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders,322 include references to restrictions on extradition in cases where the death penalty could
318. Jackman, supra note 316, at B05.
319. Henri E. Cauvin, At the Core of the Case: Should a Life Be Spared?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A01.
320. Jackson, supra note 316, at B05. Moreover, Lee Boyd Malvo is not yet
out of the danger of the juvenile penalty. He may have to face the death penalty again as he has been charged with capital murder in Prince William and
Spotsylvania counties in Virginia, as well as in Louisiana and Alabama.
Jackman, supra note 313, at A01.
321. William A. Schabas, Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment’s Role in
Extradition Law and Practice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 581, 584
(2003).
322. Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 100, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) (stating that “Extradition may be refused in any of the following circumstances … [i]f the offence
[sic] for which extradition is requested carries the death penalty under the
law of the requesting State, unless that State gives such assurances as the
requested States considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be impose, or if imposed, will not be carried out.” Article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition also includes such language.
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be imposed. The seminal case on this issue was Soering v.
United Kingdom, where the defendant fled to Great Britain after murdering his girlfriend and her parents in Virginia.323
There, the defendant, Jans Soering, petitioned the European
Commission of Human Rights to stop his extradition to the
United States on the ground that he would be subjected to the
death penalty if he were tried there.324 However, if he were to
remain in the United Kingdom, he would not face that punishment.325 The European Court of Human Rights ultimately held
that the extradition of the defendant was barred because it violated the prohibition against “inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment” in the European Convention.326 After Soering,
member countries of the Council of Europe would no longer extradite witnesses, evidence, or suspects to states where it was
probable that the death penalty would be imposed.
Furthermore, a State sending witnesses, evidence, or suspects to a requesting State could be in violation of the relevant
extradition treaty law as well as customary international law if
they extradite to a State practicing capital punishment without
first acquiring guarantees from that receiving State that the
death penalty will not be imposed. For example, Article VI of
the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United
States entitles the sending country to insist upon sufficient
guarantees that the death penalty will not be imposed as a condition for extradition.327 However, Canada had been extraditing
individuals to the United States without assurances against the
use of capital punishment for many years.328 This caused a split
between Canada and the other members of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights and then in 2001, in United
States v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed its position by refusing to allow extradition of a man who faced murder
charges and a death penalty trial in the United States.329 The
323. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America,
Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 3. See also, Schabas, supra note 321, at 585.
328. See Schabas, supra note 321, at 598.
329. United States v. Burns, 2001 S.C.C. 7 (Feb. 15, 2001).
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Court held that extradition would impose cruel and unusual
punishment on the defendant and thus would violate its
abolitionist laws.330
Similarly in the case of Pietro Venezia,331 Italy would not
honor the terms of its extradition treaty with the United States
to send the suspect to the United States for trial, even though it
had been given assurances that capital punishment would not
be sought.332 The Italian Constitutional Court declared that certain provisions of its Code of Penal Procedure, designed to give
effect to the extradition treaty between Italy and the United
States, were contrary to Article 2 of the Italian Constitution
which guarantees to Italian citizens the right to life as an inviolable human right.333
Therefore, in cases like Lee Boyd Malvo’s, if witnesses or evidence were required then Jamaica, or a country in a similar
position, could also argue that it would not send the information
because it might ultimately result in the imposition of the death
penalty on a juvenile offender, a consequence that offended its
domestic laws and customary international law. Thus the
death penalty policies of the United States, in regard to both
adults and minors, may in effect hamper the very judicial system on which our nation is based. At the very least, the United
States should comply with international law standards and
abolish the juvenile death penalty.
CONCLUSION
In continuing to execute juvenile offenders the United States
has violated its duties under international law. First, since the
United States ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
ICCPR, both of which call for the abolition of the juvenile death
penalty, it has breached its obligations under those treaties by
continuing the practice. The fact that the United States filed a
reservation to the ICCPR is irrelevant because that reservation
goes against the very purpose of the treaty and as such is invalid. Moreover, regardless of whether a defendant can bring a
330. Id.
331. Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Corte Cost., 27 June 1996,
79 Rivista di Dritto Internazionale 815 (1996).
332. Id.
333. See Schabas, supra note 321, at 597.
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private action under the ICCPR in a United States court, defendants must still be allowed to use that treaty, in addition to
the Fourth Geneva Convention, the American Convention, and
the CRC, as a defense to prosecution against them. Furthermore, the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty has reached
the level of customary international law and may even be a nonderogable jus cogens norm. Thus, the United States has violated that international norm and must conform to the newly
emerged international consensus. Finally, even if the United
States refuses to recognize and comply with the international
standards that prohibit the juvenile death penalty, it should
abolish the practice as a practical matter because of its possible
deleterious effects on the American judicial system.
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